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What is consciousness? “It is being awake,” “being responsive,” “acting,” “beingaware,” “being self-aware,” “paying attention,” “perceiving,” “feeling emo-
tions,” “feeling feelings,” “having thoughts,” “thinking about thoughts,” “it is like
this!”
Who is conscious? “We humans, surely!” Well, maybe not all the time. “Animals!”
Debatable. “Computers?” No—at least, not yet. “Other machines?” Only in fiction.
“Plants?” Absolutely not, right?
Nearly twenty-five years ago, we lived through “the project of the decade of the
brain,” a governmental initiative set forth by President
George H. W. Bush.1 Presidential Proclamation 6158
begins, “The human brain, a three-pound mass of inter-
woven nerve cells that controls our activity, is one of the
most magnificent—and mysterious—wonders of creation.
The seat of human intelligence, interpreter of senses, and
controller of movement, this incredible organ continues to
intrigue scientists and laymen alike. Over the years, our
understanding of the brain—how it works, what goes
wrong when it is injured or diseased—has increased dra-
matically. However, we still have much more to learn.”
And it concludes, “Now, Therefore, I, George Bush, Pres-
ident of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim
the decade beginning January 1, 1990, as the Decade of the
Brain. I call upon all public officials and the people of the
United States to observe that decade with appropriate pro-
grams, ceremonies, and activities.” 
What the former President did not say—what is perhaps understood by his read-
ers—is that the brain is quite different from other body parts that have come under
scientific investigation. We might be grateful to receive a donated kidney, or to have
an artificial heart. But unlike every other body part, without my brain, there may be
no I. Our sense of self, of awareness, of life—are profoundly connected to a working
brain. A philosopher once said, “in a brain transplant, one wants to be the donor not
the recipient.” Indeed, saying that the brain is the seat of mentality is like saying that
the sun is a source of light. 
The decade of the brain is now over. No longer are the questions on the order of
“What region of the brain is associated with facial recognition?” But rather, “Which
particular neuron fires before a picture of Halle Berry’s face?” We have learned that
the different frequency and synchronization with which neu-
rons fire is associated with different states of conscious aware-
ness. There is optimism that diseases such as Alzheimer’s could
be treatable with therapies implemented at the neural level.
We have entered the era of the neuron. 
But for all that this trajectory has and will accomplish, we
seem no closer to answering basic (actually, quite old) ques-
tions about the relationship between the mind and the body—between conscious-
ness and the physical substrates that realize it. 
These questions come in two general forms. First, a metaphysical point: why
should this particular physical matter (the neurochemical, the nerve cell, the neural
network) give rise to consciousness? It seems we can imagine creatures who have
brains just like ours, but who don’t feel pain. So why do we feel it? Why does acti-
vation of group C nerve fibers in my brain give rise to pain, rather than some other
feeling, or nothing at all? Second, an epistemological point: even if we were to know
everything about this particular physical matter (the neurochemical, the nerve cell,
the neural network), what does this tell us about consciousness? Tell me all there is
to know about the chemistry of H20, and I might know what water is. Tell me all
there is to know about the neural biological basis of pain, and I still surely won’t
know what pain is. Unless I have experienced it myself, a truly essential aspect—how
pain feels—has been left out.
These metaphysical and epistemological questions together form what philoso-
phers call, respectively, “the hard problem” and “the knowledge argument.” We can
combine them, limit the jargon, and talk about “the problem of consciousness.”
In what is perhaps the best known articulation of the problem of consciousness,
in Thomas Nagel’s essay “What is it like to be a bat?” (1974), he stipulates that no
matter what form consciousness might take, “there is something it like to be” con-
scious, there is “something it is like for” a conscious being, and no objective fact will
ever explain this subjective fact.2 The best we can hope is to establish correlations
between the two. Posit a connection stronger than correlation, and we overstep. 
If this were all there was to say, we would have to learn to live with the problem
of consciousness. But in the final paragraphs of the self-same article, Nagel offered
an alternative. The problem of consciousness “should be regarded as a challenge to
form new concepts and devise a new method—an objective phenomenology not
dependent on empathy or imagination. Though presumably it would not capture
everything, its goal would be to describe, at least in part, the subjective character of
experience in a form comprehensible to beings incapable of having those experi-
ences. […] It should be possible to devise a method of expressing in objective terms
much more than we can at present, and with much greater precision.” The proposal,
simply put, was to develop a language to describe subjectivity in non-subjective
terms. And although it is definitely not the case that all theorists pushing past the
problem of consciousness consider themselves to be implementing Nagel’s plan, it
does help to understand a particular set of accumulated answers. Two fundamental
approaches have been neurophilosophy and neurophenomenology, each emphasizing
one aspect of Nagel’s suggestion—either the objective part
(viz. neurophilosophy) or the phenomenology part (viz.
neurophenomenology). 
Despite the similarity of nomenclature, neurophiloso-
phy and neurophenomenology are very different
approaches emerging from different traditions. 
Suppose we start, though, with what the neurophiloso-
pher and the neurophenomenologist share. Both hold in
common the belief that the problem of consciousness is a
pseudoproblem created by our inability to move beyond
the conceptual binarism of mind versus body—an error
Gilbert Ryle identified in his famous critique of “the
dogma of the ghost in the machine.” Both the neu-
rophilosopher and the neurophenomenologist agree that
the problem of consciousness is generated by some combi-
nation of false dichotomies and faulty concepts. However,
they each have different ways of solving it. 
Neurophilosophy develops in the “analytic” philosophical tradition in the late
twentieth century. Its early formulation can be found in Patricia Churchland’s 1986
book Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain. But it is also man-
ifest in the work of many other theorists (e.g., Paul Churchland, Antonio Damasio,
Christof Koch). Neurophilosophy is a reductionist theory of consciousness, one that
aspires to the Quinean goal of eliminating all things that cannot be reduced to phys-
ical (or functional) processes, within which a general method emerges. First, it iden-
tifies ideas about consciousness derived from common sense, folk psychology, or
introspection. Second, it reduces these “soft” concepts to “hard” neuroscientific
data. Third, if they no longer are practically useful, it eliminates the original ideas
about consciousness in favor of their neurobiological counterparts. To give an
embarrassingly oversimplified example, take the conventional
idea of the love one feels for one’s child. The neurophilosopher
takes this subjective idea and, informed by the best neuro-
science available, translates it into an objective account—
imagine the neurophilosopher saying, “Love is nothing more
than oxytocin release.” In the future, the neurophilosopher
will replace the word “love” with the more perspicuous word
“oxytocin” in everyday conversation. About the possibility that the feeling of
parental love is just neural chemistry, Patricia Churchland herself said, “well, actu-
ally, yes, it is. But that doesn’t bother me.”3
Thus, the neurophilosopher strives to convert mind into matter, parsing a singu-
lar subjective phenomenon in a shared objective language. But eliminating con-
sciousness in our favor of the neuron may give away more than is necessary or useful.
The price of characterizing consciousness in a more scientific language need not be
the abandonment of consciousness itself.
If neuroscience hopes to do more than describe arbitrary processes at the neural
level, it will always need conscious experience to direct where to look in the brain.
We are not mere bystanders in the investigation of consciousness. Our own con-
sciousness is both essential and unavoidable in this endeavor. Neuroscience some-
times forgets that it begins with what interests us about our own conscious
experience. And while this certainly involves the fascination with our own subjec-
tivity, it also involves our personal histories, our embodied and embedded situations,
and our social values. Strictly speaking, the feeling of love for one’s child is not oxy-
tocin release. More precisely, parental love is disclosed to us through oxytocin release,
as a situated normative phenomenon. An (imagined) culture that doesn’t value
parental love will not care one lick to discover what its neural correlate happens to
be. Oxytocin release is important to us here and now because it is tied to the feeling
of love for one’s child, a subjective phenomenon that we already recognize and
value. For this reason alone, neuroscience needs the first-person point of view.
There is a deeper problem to consider, however, one that insinuates itself into all
investigations of consciousness. Technically, we never establish identity statements
linking neurochemical processes directly to consciousness. What we do get are
equivalences linking our conception of neurochemical processes to our conception
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of consciousness. We then have to wonder how accurate and stable our concepts
are. To what extent do the concepts we use transform the explananda? This is par-
ticularly relevant when what we are trying to explain is consciousness itself.
How do we understand consciousness without becoming complicit in that
understanding, wrongly attaching the properties of our (conscious) inquiry to the
properties of the inquired into (consciousness)? We can never completely avoid our
own contribution, however accidental, to the discovery process. This is true for the
philosopher in her armchair as well as the scientist in her lab. When investigating
consciousness, there emerges, for lack of a better phrase, a kind of “observer effect.”
The fact that consciousness is both the tool for investigation and the thing to be
investigated leads to a lot of mischief. To take a classic example: when we talk
about the visual experiences of a red apple, a red stop sign, and a red sweater, we
can isolate their red quality, their redness. But is this abstracted quality—the color
distinct from its object—a property of our visual experience of the object, as is gen-
erally assumed, or is it rather a property of our reflection on the visual experience of
the object? What if “a color is never simply a color, but rather the color of a certain
object, and the blue of a rug would not be the same
blue if it were not a wooly blue?” (Maurice Merleau-
Ponty4). Simply put, in visual experience, prior to
reflection, what if there is no such thing as uninstan-
tiated redness? 
The neurophilosopher in search of the neural cor-
relate of redness has already assumed an answer to these questions. But this
assumption may be, at best, unwarranted and, at worst, wrong. The neurophenom-
enologist, on the other hand, takes such concerns effectively as her starting point. 
Neurophenomenology emerges out of “Continental” philosophy in the late
twentieth century. At its inception, we find Francisco Varela, who articulated the
approach in his 1996 article “Neurophenomenology: A Methodological Remedy
for the Hard Problem.” Since then there have been many collaborators in the
development of this movement (e.g., Evan Thompson, Shaun Gallagher, Vittorio
Gallese, Giacomo Rizzolatti). Growing out of the phenomenological tradition ini-
tiated by Edmund Husserl, neurophenomenology is primarily a method that
attempts to naturalize consciousness. First, it identifies a multiplicity of cases, both
observed (scientific, empirical) and introspected (described, imagined), in which
consciousness is operative. Second, setting aside questions of the physical (func-
tional) reality of consciousness, it identifies the invariant structures that all these
cases have in common. Third, it uses these invariant structures to furnish an idea
of consciousness that is consonant with the natural sciences. 
To give an example of how this works, consider two accounts—the phenomeno-
logical and the neuroscientific—of how we come to understand the actions of oth-
ers. That is, why do we experience the observed bodily movements of other people
as genuine actions rather than as mere automation? I do not see a sequence of
movements, take a moment to assess the situation, and then make an inference to
the best explanation of what a person is doing. As is often the case with my own
movements, I know immediately, directly, and implicitly what action is underway.
But those are my actions to which I have privileged access. How is it, then, that I
seem to have the same kind of access to the actions of others? 
Phenomenologists have long argued that our access to the intentional goal-
directed actions of others is actually the reverse side of our access to our own inten-
tional actions (e.g., Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Dan Zahavi, Natalie
Depraz). For instance, when my partner lifts a heavy box, I understand what is hap-
pening instantaneously, without any inference or intervening judgment. I might
even, also without thinking, reach out and offer my assistance. We live in a shared
world that we experience together, the phenomenologists claim, through a kind of
“bodily reciprocity”—when we see another person acting intentionally, we experi-
ence the same intention in our own bodies, and we transpose our motor intentions
into that person.
Neuroscientists discovered that activity in the premotor cortex of the brain was
correlated with the preparation of certain physical movements in response to sen-
sory stimulus (e.g., Giacomo Rizzolatti, Vitorrio Gallese). These physical move-
ments were not reflexive responses, but rather intentional goal-directed
actions—such as reaching, tearing, grasping. These same neuroscientists also dis-
covered that a subset of neurons in the premotor cortex not only activate during
the execution of intentional actions, but also dis-
charge when observing  similar intentional actions
performed by another individual. These neurons do
not activate, however, when one’s body moves or is
moved unintentionally in a physically analogous
manner. For an example from the original experi-
ments, whether a monkey reaches for a raisin or watches another monkey reach for
a raisin, the same sets of neurons are activated. But if the monkey’s arm is moved
passively towards a raisin, those neurons do not discharge. These neurons appear to
mirror the active movements of others, particularly, conspecifics—hence the
nomenclature, “mirror neurons.”
The task of the neurophenomenologist now becomes to integrate all this data,
finding the invariant structures they share. A first striking commonality is that, on
both accounts, to observe an action is also to simulate it through transpositional
(viz. bodily reciprocity) or mirroring (viz. mirror neurons) processes. Another point
of convergence is that these processes are not reflective, linguistic or intellectual.
Instead, they appear to be prereflective, nonverbal, and practical. A third parallel
is that these interactions occur specifically among conspecifics. This suggests some
kind of intersubjectivity at work—in order to simulate the other, we have first to
identify with it. There may be other homologies, too, but even with just these
three, a single unified explanation is already taking shape. Our understanding of
the movements of others as genuine actions is fundamentally a bodily understand-
ing, one that is experienced through shared empathetic connections with other like
beings, whereby we simulate in ourselves their intentional goal-directed actions,
transposing into them our motor intentions, a capacity realized by dedicated neural
processes in the brain.
Neurophenomenology, as an approach to understanding consciousness, is not in
competition with phenomenological description or scientific data. It is an intrigu-
ing place where we are allowed to surpass the alternative of subjectivity and objec-
tivity, interpolating a conceptual space between them, in which a deeper
understanding of both can emerge, a place that we already knew could be inhab-
ited, in a way, because our very existence proves mind and matter compatible. !
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WHEN INVESTIGATING CONSCIOUSNESS,
THERE EMERGES, FOR LACK OF A BETTER
PHRASE, A KIND OF “OBSERVER EFFECT.” 
The Institute’s thirteenth annual Prospects in Theoretical Physics (PiTP) summer programfor graduate students and postdoctoral scholars, which focused on string theory, was truly
extraordinary in that it overlapped with Strings 2014. This is one of the field’s most important
gatherings, which the Institute hosted with Princeton University, convening international
experts and researchers to discuss string theory and its most recent developments. Six hundred
attendees gathered for Strings 2014, which made it one of the largest Strings conferences since
their inception in 1995. 
Strings 2014 talks, which covered topics from B-mode cosmology and the theory of inflation
to quantum entanglement, the amplituhedron, and the fate of spacetime, may be viewed at
https://physics.princeton.edu/strings2014/Talk_titles.shtml.
The program for PiTP and videos of its string theory talks may be viewed at
https://pitp2014.ias.edu/schedule.html. As part of the PiTP program, the Institute showed a
screening of “Particle Fever,” a new film that follows six scientists, including the Institute’s
Nima Arkani-Hamed, during the launch of the Large Hadron Collider and fortutiously captures
the discovery of the Higgs particle. Peter Higgs, who predicted the existence of the particle fifty
years ago, gave one of his first seminars on the topic at the Institute in 1966. 
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